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Abstract 
Political Economy Section 
The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), between Canada and the 
European Union (EU), was leaked to the public opinion in August 2014 after five years of 
negotiations. The consolidated CETA text was not released until the end of last September, 
raising deeper issues about the secrecy and democratic deficit surrounding the agreement. 
As sorne have already noted (notably civil society organizations), this treaty is about much 
more than trade. Even though the preamble states that it aims to strengthen economic 
relationships, the text includes an expl icit reference to the commitments of both Parties to 
the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions and underlies their right to preserve, develop and implement their cultural 
pol icies, and to support their cultural industries for the purpose of strengthening the diversity 
of cu ltural expressions and preserving their cu ltural identity (including the use of regu latory 
measures and financia ! support). Beyond these intentions enunciated in the preamble, there 
are only five chapters conta ining articles exempting cu lture (Subsidies, lnvestment, Cross-
Border Trade in Services, Domestic Regulation and Government Procurement). Therefore, 
the text lacks a general exception clause protecting culture. 
The question about the capacity of this free trade agreement to actually protect and pro mote 
the diversity of cu lture is therefore va lid because, for example, whereas for the EU the 
exception applies only to audiovisual services, for Canada it covers all cultura l industries (as 
usually defined in its trade agreements). Is this a missed opportunity for both Canada and the 
EU to safeguard cu lture from trade, to reconcile ru les of free trade and cu ltural policies? Can 
the inclusion of the UNESCO Convention in the CETA text help counterba lance and resist 
those principies of free trade that undermine necessary and legit imate cultura l policies and 
regu lations aiming to protect and promete the diversity of cultura l expressions? 
This contribution will aim to explore answers to these questions taking the consolidated CETA 
text as a point of departure. After providing contextual information about the agreement 
itself and its evolution, key points concerning cultura l exemptions will be examined with a 
political economy perspective to clarify up to what extent there wi ll be room for manoeuvre 
to actually protect and promete the diversity of cultura l industries. 
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l . lntroduction 
In May 2009 negotiations between Canada and the European Union (EU) toward a 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) were launched. Over the years the 
agreement turned out to be deeper and broader than any previous arrangement (for 
example, the North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA). The word comprehensive that 
is included in its title refers to the fact that negotiations have been really bread, including all 
business sectors, and deep, taking into consideration tariff and non-tari ff barriers to trade 
(such as provincial and municipal procurement policy or cultural policy incentives). 
Current trade relations between Canada and the EU are guided by a Framework Agreement 
for Commercial and Economic Cooperation in force since 1976. The EU and Canada meet 
annually in b ilatera l summits and in the Joint Cooperation Committee to review a range of 
issues relating to economic and trade relations. Over the years, a number of additional 
bilateral agreements designed to facilitate trade have been concluded. 
Nevertheless, at the 2007 EU-Canada Summit in Berlin, Canada and the EU agreed to 
complete a joint study examining the costs and benefits of pursuing a closer economic 
partnership. The study (Canada-EU, 2008), which concluded that significant benefits cou ld be 
realized by liberal izing trade between Canada and the EU, was reviewed at the 2008 Canada-
EU Summit in Quebec and used as an argument to just ify the pursue of further trade 
liberalization. lt was also agreed that necessary steps to obtain negotiating mandates with a 
view to beginning formal negotiations as early as possible in 2009 were taken. At first, 
Canadian and EU officials conducted a "scoping exercise" to establish the areas for 
negot iation of an ambitious and comprehensive economic agreement (Canada-EU, 2009). 
Such exercise was completed in March 2009, paving the way for the launch of actual 
negotiations at the EU-Canada Summit on May 6, 2009, in Prague. 
According to the European Commission, the EU-Canada trade picture can be characterized 
as follows:1 
• In 2013 Canada was the EU's 12th most important trading partner, accounting for 1.7% 
of the EU's total externa! trade. In the same year the EU was Ca111ada's second most 
important trad ing partner, after the United States (US), with around 9.8% of Canada's 
totall externa! trade. 
• The value of bilateral trade in goods between the EU and Ca nada was €58,8 billion in 
2013. Machinery, transport equipment and chemica ls dominate t he EU's exports of 
goods to Canada, and also constitute an important part of the EU's imports of goods 
from Canada. 
• Trade in services is an important area of the EU-Canada trade relationship too. The 
value of bi lateral trade in services between the two partners amounted to €26.9 
billion in 2012. Examples of services often traded are transportation, travel and 
insurance. 
• The investment relationship is equally important. In 2011, European investors held 
invest ments worth €258.0 billion in Canada while Canadian direct investment stocks 
in the EU amounted to almost €142.6 billion. 
For the European Commission, the CETA is a treaty that, once applied, will offer EU firms 
more and better business opportunities in Ca nada and support jobs in Europe. lt will tack le a 
whole range of issues to make business with Canada easier: from removing customs duties 
and ending limitations in access to public contracts, to helping prevent il legal copying of EU 
1 http:Uec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/canada/ 
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innovat ions and traditional products. Mirroring this discourse, the Government of Canada 
assures that the agreement will open new markets to Canadian exporters throughout the EU 
and will generate significant benefits for its nat ionals, especially in terms of creating jobs and 
opportunities in every region of the country. 
The Commission's lawyers are currently reviewing the consolidated text, and once it is 
translated into all EU official languages it will be discussed in the EU Counci l and the European 
Parliament. Providing both approve the agreement in 2015, anda similar process takes place 
in Canada, it could be applied in 2016. While the agreement may undergo sorne changes 
during the scrubbing process, both parties consider the text closed. Therefore, no substantive 
changes are in fact expected. 
The secrecy and democratic deficit surrounding negot iat ions were very much criticized since 
the beginning, anda consolidated version of the agreement was not actually known by public 
opinion until it was leaked in August 2014 by German broadcaster ARO, after negotiators of 
the Commission and of Canada had fina lized their work early t hat month. The text of the 
agreement was made public when President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel 
Barroso, President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and Canadian Prime 
Minister, Stephen Harper, announced the end of the CETA negotiations at the EU-Canada 
Summit on 26 September 2014. lt is clear that "both sides have committed to sign off on the 
final text before any meaningful public debate can possibly take place. This take-it or leave-
it approach leaves little room for the citizens of Canada or the EU to assess the CETA's 
potential impacts, let alone advocate for changes" (Sinclair, Trew, & Mertins-Kirkwodd, 2014: 
5). 
In Ca nada, unions and civil society organizations issued a declaration in 2011 against ongoing 
negotiations,2 and more and better information about the deal has been available during the 
last years thanks to the efforts of initiatives such as Trade Justice Network or organizations 
like the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives or The Council of Canadians. 
In Europe, 300 groups gathered round the Stop TTIP Coalition have filed a lawsuit against the 
European Commission over its failure to publically review its policy over the CETA and the 
Transatlantic Trade and lnvestment Partnership (TTIP), under negotiation with the US. The 
Coalition proposed that the Commission hold a European Cit izens' lnitiative, which is 
designed to make the Commission more accountable to the general public, but the 
Commission blocked the request to review its policy on the TTIP and CETA deals. Had the 
initiative been accepted, the Commission would have been obliged to hold a hearing to 
discuss its negotiating policy3. In any case, it is for sure that the European Parliament will 
scrutinize whether, as the EU's negot iator, the European Commission succeeded or not in 
striking the right balance between economic liberalization and consumer protection 
(Bierbrauer,. 2014). 
In this context, the question about the capacity of the CETA to actually protect and promete 
the diversity of culture is therefore important, because despite the fact that its preamble 
states that it aims to strengthen economic relationships, the arrangement is about much 
more than trade. lt is worth noting that it includes an explicit reference to the commitments 
of both Parties to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity 
of Cultural Expressions (hereafter the "UNESCO Convention") and underlies their right to 
2 http://stopceta.ca/declaration/ 
3 
For further details see http://www.ibtimes.eo.uk/european-commission-served-lawsu it-over-ttip-ceta-
negotiations-1474094 and http://www.attac.es/2014/12/04/la-iniciativa-ciudadana-europea-autoorganizada-
contra-el-ttip-y-el-ceta-consigue-un-millon-de-firmas-en-un-t iempo-record/ 
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preserve, develop and implement their cu ltura l pol icies, and to support the ir cultural 
industries for t he purpose of strengthening the diversity of cultura l expressions and 
preserving t heir cultural identity (including the use of regulatory measures and financia! 
support). Nevert heless, the text lacks a general exception clause protecting cult ure. What 
has been agreed is that sorne chapters contain articles exempting cu lture. Whereas for t he 
EU t his exception applies only to audiovisual services, for Canada it covers all cultural 
industries. 
Is this a missed opportunity for both Canada and the EU to safeguard culture from t rade, to 
reconcile rules of free t rade and cult ural policies? Can the inclusion of t he UNESCO 
Convention in the CETA text help counterbalance and resist those principies of free trade that 
undermine necessary and legit imate cult ural pol icies and regulat ions aiming to protect and 
promote the diversity of cultura l expressions? This paper aims to explore answers to these 
questions taking t he consolidated CETA text as a point of depart ure. After providing 
contextua l information about the agreement and its negotiation, key points concerning 
cult ural exemptions will be examined with a political economy perspective to clarify up to 
what extent there wil l be room for manoeuvre to actually protect and promote the diversity 
of cultura l indust ries. 
2. What is the CETA really about? 
The CETA is the first t rade agreement between t he EU and a major world economy and t he 
most far-reach ing bilateral negotiation to date because it is not a t raditional free t rade 
agreement such as NAFTA, where customs duties (tariffs) on trade in goods and services are 
eliminated. The CETA is a second-generation trade agreement (Leblond, 2010; Hübner, 2011) 
where the emphasis is on non-tariff barriers such as standards, procedures and regu lations, 
since t hey have, for instance, become the main source of trade impediments dueto the fact 
that tariffs are already quite low - especially between rich countries, as a result of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organizatiorn (WTO). 
What are sorne of the issues the agreement presents? Public services, for example, tace huge 
challenges beca use of the "negative list" approach the agreement is based on (Sinclair, Trew, 
& Mertins-Kirkwodd, 2014). The libera lizing provisions affect all public services unless 
explicitly ru led out by negotiators. This " list it or lose it" perspective is a serious threat for the 
future of many public services. Likewise, as regards intellectual property rights, the extension 
of patents was on the table of negotiations from the very beginning. And although most of 
the initial EU demands on copyright and related rights have been withdrawn, changes to the 
Canadian patent protection for pharmaceutica ls are expected to delay the availability of 
cheaper, effective generic drugs for Canadians (Sinclair, Trew, & Mertins-Kirkwodd, 2014). 
Undoubtedly, one of the most controversia! aspects of the agreement is the investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which has raised much concern in Canada and many 
of Europe's member states (e.g. Germany) and is most probably going t o be rejected by a 
large bloc of parties in the European Parliament. The ISDS mechanism and the lnvestment 
Protection section pave t he way for fore ign corporations to seek compensation for 
governments, for any measure that may hurt their investments, outside the regular court 
system. Very briefly, and in Fuchs' words (2014: 13-14): "foreign investors wi ll be granted the 
special privi lege of suing host governments and claiming compensation for all kinds of state 
act ions, whi le bypassing domestic judicial systems and their independent courts"; t he CETA 
does not require investors to first resort to domestic courts in solving disputes and it doesn't 
clearly and unequivocally confirm t he state's right to regulate. 
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As Friends of t he Earth Europe have recently demonst rated (Geraghty & Cingotti: 2014), 
after compil ing publicly avai lable data on ISDS cases taken against EU member states since 
1994, the use of t his mechanism has been affecting states for years and it has already cost 
EU taxpayers €3.5 billion. "Canada's experience with NAFTA amply illustrates the dangers of 
invest ment arbitration. There have been 35 investor-state claims against Canada under 
NAFTA, and the number continues to grow. So far, Canada has lost or seittled six claims and 
paid damages to foreign investors totaling over C$171.5 million (€121 million). Canadian 
taxpayers have also paid tens of millions of dollars in legal costs defending against these 
claims" (Eberhardt, Red lin & Toubeau, 2014: 5). 
Negotiation.s between the EU and Canada have been criticized not only because of secrecy 
but also for having been developed closely and almost exclusively in collaboration wit h 
industry lobby groups that have had privileged access to negotiation texts (The Council of 
Canadians, 2013). 
3. What is the matter w ith culture and diversity? 
So ... what is, more specifically, t he treat ment given to culture? Even though negotiations 
failed to indude a general exemption, t he agreement has an explicit reference to the 
commit ments of both Parties to t he UNESCO Convention and it includes articles exempting 
cult ure in five chapters. What does this mean? What's t he role assigned to culture, in general, 
and to cult ural industries and diversity, in particular? Befo re trying to answer these questions 
the debate about cult ure during negotiations as wells as the presence of t he Convention in 
the preamble of the agreement and the content and scope of cultural exemptions have to be 
explained. 
3.1. The debate: a "general exclusion" vs. a "targeted approach" 
Among t hose willing to safeguard culture from trade, there have been two main positions: 
the one identified as the "horizontal" or "general exclusion" approach, opposed to the 
"flexible" or "targeted" approach. The former, defended by the French Coalition for Cult ural 
Diversity and publicly endorsed in 2013 by people such as Bernard Cazeneuve (then French 
Minister Delegate for European Affairs) and Louise Beaudoin (former Minister of 
lnternational Relations and Minister for the Francophonie), demanded t he tota l exclusion of 
cult ure from negotiations. The latt er, contained in the proposal of Canada and Quebec's ch ief 
negotiators and supported by the Coalition for Cultural Diversity, was presented as a way to 
reconcile Canadian and European visions via establishing exemptions chapter by chapter (a 
"negative list" approach). 
The rationa le behind this perspective, successful up to now in the wording of the text , is that 
a flexible way of pursuing cultural exemption is the best way to guarantee an agreement 
between Europe and Canada. Because whereas t he EU includes an exemption limited to the 
audiovisual services, only in t he services chapter, in all of its free trade agreements, Canada 
defends a notion of cultural exemption that covers all cultura l indust ries in all chapters of its 
trade agreements. During t he bilateral negotiations on t he CETA, Quebec and France exerted 
pressure to have a cultural exception explicitly included in t he deal. But "although Canadian 
and European política! leaders and negotiators agreed on t he principie, leaked 
documentation showed that the negotiating parties disagreed on the scope of the cultural 
exemption and on how to fulfill Canada and the EU member state obligations under the 
UNESCO Convention. This is reflected in t he final text" (Maltais, 2014b: 51). 
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In other words, the CETA wording as regards culture has to be understood as a combination 
of the Canadian threefold strategy as well as the European Commission's change in policy 
direction around November 2012. Canada's strategy aimed at: a) express cultural 
considerations in the preamble, b) include its traditional definition of cultural industries with 
exceptions limited to selected chapters and c) make reservations on specific cultural sectors 
and regulations in the annexes. As regards the EU, although the inclusion of the audiovisual 
sector in trade agreements had systematically been refused ever .since the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) negot iations, the European Commission, that 
pronounced itself in favor of exempting audiovisual services from the negotiations with 
Canada, ended up supporting their inclusion via the mechanism of building "negative lists". 
3.2. The wording: between the UNESCO Convention and specific cultural exempt ions 
The preamble of the CETA, in a page and half of a 537-page document (1634 with annexes!), 
contains two references to culture: 
RECOGNIZING that the provisions of this Agreement preserve the right to regu late within 
their territories and resolving to preserve their flexibi lity to achieve legitimate policy 
objectives, such as public health, safety, environment, public morals and the promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity; and 
AFFIRMING their commitments as Parties to the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and recogn izing that states have the right 
to preserve, develop and implement their cultural policies, and to support their cultural 
industries far the purpose of strengthening the diversity of cultural expressions, and 
preserving their cu ltu ral identity, includ ing through the use of regulatory measures and 
financia! support. 
Whereas the first reference underlines the promotion and protection of cultural diversity as 
a legitimate policy objective, the second gives context by referring to the UNESCO 
Convention and its principies. According to the Coalition for Cultural Diversity (CCD, 2014), 
this sets a precedent because this is the first time that a reference to the UNESCO Convention 
is included in a trade agreement. Nevertheless, it cannot be forgotten that although the 
content of the preamble is supposed to contribute to the interpretation of the agreement 
and offer context to potentia l disputes, it is non-binding. 
As regards the so-called cultura l exemptions, they are limited to five of the nearly three-
dozen chapiters of the agreement: Subsidies, lnvestment, Cross- Border Trade in Services, 
Domestic Regulation and Government Procurement. The chapter on subsidies completely 
exempts subsidies and government support from any provision of the agreement, but 
elsewhere, t he exclusion is either limited to the chapter or its relevant provisions. 
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Chapter Article 
9. Subsidies X.7 Excluded 
Subsidies and 
Government 
Support - Cu lture 
10. X.1: Scope of 
lnvestment Application 
11. Cross- X-01: Scope 
Border 
Trade in 
Services 
14. Domestic X.1: Scope and 
Regulation Definitions 
21. XII. Lim ited 
Government Tendering 
Procurement 
Word ing 
Nothing in this Agreement applies to subsidies or 
government support w ith respect to aud iovisua l services 
for the EU and to cultura l industries far Ca nada. 
3. For the EU, the Section on Establishment of lnvestments 
and Section on Non-Discrim inatoryTreatment do not apply 
to measures with respect to Aud iovisua l services. 
For Canada, the Section on Establishment of lnvestments 
and Section on Non-Discrim inatory Treatment do not apply 
to measures with respect to cu ltural industries. 
2. Th is Chapter does not apply to measures affect ing: 
(a) services supplied in the exercise of governmenta l 
authority; 
(b) for t he European Un ion, audio-visual services; 
(c) for Ca nada, cu ltural indust ries; 
( ... ) 
2. This Chapter does not apply to licensing requ irements 
and procedures and to qualification requ irements and 
procedures: a) pursuant to an existing non-conforming 
measure that is maintained by a Party as set out in its 
Schedule to Annex 1; or b) relating to the sectors/activities 
set out be low: 
For Canada: Socia l Services, Aborigina l Affairs, Minority 
Affa irs, and the collection, purification, and distribution of 
water, as set out in Canada's schedu le to Annex 11, and 
cu ltural industries. 
For the European Union: Health, education, and socia l 
services, gambling and bett ing services, the co llection, 
purificat ion, and distribution of water, as set out in the EU's 
schedu le to Annex 11, and audio-visual services. 
l. Provided that it does not use this provision for the 
purpose of avoid ing competit ion among suppliers or in a 
manner that discriminates aga inst suppliers of the other 
Party or protects domestic suppliers, a procuring entity 
may use limited tendering and may choose not to apply 
Articles VI through VIII, IX (paragraphs 7 through 11), X, XI, 
XIII and XIV only under any of the following circumstances: 
( ... ) 
(b) where the goods or services can be supplied on ly by a 
particu lar supplier and no reasonable alternative or 
substitute goods or services exist for any of the following 
reasons: 
(i) the requ irement is for a work of art; 
(ii) the protect ion of patents, copyrights or other exclusive 
rights; or 
(iii) dueto an absence of compet it ion for technica l reasons; 
( ... ) 
In Maltais' words (2014a), the CETA includes a partia l and asymmet ric cu ltura l exception: 
partia l as it is only applicable in sorne chapters, asymmetric beca use far the EU t he exception 
only applies to audiovisual services whereas far Canada it covers all cu ltura l indust ries, as 
usually defined in its trade agreements. Such definition is faund in Chapter 32, Exceptions 
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(Art icle X.01), where a reminder of t he scope of the cultural exemption is also included 
(Art icle X.08). 
Chapter 
32. 
Exceptions 
Article 
X.01: Defin it ions 
X.08: Cultural 
Industries 
Wording 
Cultural industries means a person engaged in: 
(a) the publication, distribution or sa le of books, 
magazines, periodica ls or newspapers in print or machine-
readable form, except when printing o r typesetting any of 
the foregoing is the only activity; 
(b) the production, distribution, sa le or exhibition of film 
or video recordings; the production, d istribution, sale or 
exhibition of audio or video music recordings; the 
publication, distribution or sale of music in print or 
machine-readable form; or rad iocommunications in 
which the t ransmissions are intended for direct reception 
by the general public, and all rad io, television and cable 
broadcasting undertakings and all satellite programming 
and broadcast network services. 
The parties recal l the exceptions applicable to culture as 
set out in the relevant provisions of Chapters X, Y and Z 
(Cross-Border Trade in Services, Domestic Regu lation, 
Government Procurement, lnvestment, Subsidies) . 
3.3. The implications: "list it or lose it!" 
The supporters of the "targeted" or "flexible" perspective sustain that advantages are 
numerous (CCD, 2013), considering that t he inclusion of t he UNESCO Convention in the 
preamble clarifies the grounds on which Canada and the EU agree to cultura l exemptions: 
• The "chapter by chapter" approach establishes with greater precision the perimeter 
of cultural sovereignty because it reassures that the counterpart recognizes 
exempting intentions. 
• lt gives flexibil ity not to demand a cultural exemption in chapters that are irrelevant 
or t hat should not be weakened (e.g. t he one about intellectual property). 
• And it could be requested in the future by Ca nada and the EU when dealing with other 
part ners t hat oppose cultural exemptions. 
Contrary to this perspective, critics such as the French Coal it ion for Cultural Diversity (CFDC, 
2012) are of the opinion t hat "negative lists" do not afford the same protection as a 
"horizontal exclusion" beca use listing sectors to be included in annexes wi ll ultimately define 
and delimit their scope for future appl ication. The abil ity of states to develop new policies 
can be hampered whi le the capacity of trading partners to define listed sectors as narrowly 
as possible, to limit the scope of protection, is enabled. 
In other words, whereas a "horizontal exclusion" helps states maintain autonomy and avoid 
embroi led negotiations, the "negative list" approach includes, ipso facto, all services among 
those liberalized under the agreement, leaving aside only what is explicitly listed as excluded 
in the annexes. The risk consists of leaving certa in cultura l domains under the pressure of 
trade negotiations and neglecting those sectors that could be very import ant with the arrival 
of new technologies (e.g., electronic commerce; Vlassis, 2014). 
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4. As a way of concluding 
What's then the ro le the CETA assigns to culture, in general, and to cultura l industries and 
diversity, in particular, since negotiations led to the decision of reconci ling culture and t rade 
via the inclusion of the UNESCO Convention in the preamble and the specification of sorne 
exemptions in a "chapter by chapter" approach? Because a general exemption was ru led out 
for culture, which mea ns that there's a general and de facto inclusion of it,. it is here sustained 
that the role assigned to culture and its diversity is secondary and subsumed to free t rade 
relationships. The fact that exemptions are confined to specific chapters, and that they apply 
to audiovisual services for the EU and to cultura l industries for Canada, reveal different 
interpretations in the scope of the cultura l exception anda partial and asymmetric protection 
that one may wonder how will evolve. But the problem is not just that existing cultural 
expressions are partially and asymmetrically protected because there are divergent 
perspectives about the matter. Worries should also look forward: into the digital era. 
With the exception of subsidies, that are completely exempted, cultura l exemptions are 
limited to sorne chapters and relevant provisions. This means that what is not actually and 
explicitly included in the articles or the list of specific reservations of each Party is not 
protected. Take for instance the list of reservations made to Chapter 35 (Services and 
lnvestment): words such as "digita l" or " internet" are completely absent. In addition, it's 
worth noting that Canada and the EU have agreed to "import" Article XX of the GATT on 
General Exceptions and to make it applicable to all CETA chapters (Maltais, 2014b: 53): the 
problem with this is that Article XX of the GATT includes no "cultural exception" per se as the 
provisions limit its scope to the "protection of national treasures of artistic, historie or 
archaeological va lue". Whi le the analogue past might be well served, the digita l future of the 
diversity of cultura l expressions is consigned to oblivion. 
Sorne insist on the opportunities that may arise from the inclusion of the UNESCO Convention 
in the agreement (CCD, 2013) to mitigate, for example, the risks of the logic of partial 
exemptions. lt's nota minor thing that for the f irst time since its adoption the Convention is 
referenced in a t rade agreement. The CETA preamble is innovative in th is respect, expressing 
the best intentions of the Parties to protect and promete cultural diversity. But as we all 
know, the road to hell is paved with good intent ions. Therefore, the (soft) regulation effect 
that the UNESCO Convention can have wil l succumb to the (prescriptive) one that the specific 
provisions -the chapters- will have. The preamble may contribute to mitigating the negat ive 
impact of liberalization measures, because a t reaty must be interpreted in light of its object 
and purpose, but where free trade ru les are in contradiction with cultura l protection and 
promotion policies, panel ists or arbitrators would be more likely to favor the former 
(Maltais', 2014b: 51). 
From our point of view, the risks of relying on the logic of specific exemptions for existing 
services to face the digital era greatly surpass the benefits the reference to the UNESCO 
Convention may provide. Many have already reminded the challenges the Convention poses 
to tace the adaptation of cultural diversity to the new digital environment (e.g. Frau-Meigs, 
2012). The inclusion of cultural considerations in the CETA preamble and the reference to the 
UNESCO Convention are to be applauded (Malta is, 2014a; Vlassis, 2014), but as the so le 
strategy to protect and promete the diversity of current and future cultu ral expressions the 
outcome is uncertain. The inclusion of the UNESCO Convention asan interpretative tool will 
have a hard t ime to counterbalance and help resist free trade commitments when they 
undermine ithe diversity of cultural expressions. The "list it or lose it" approach wil l indeed 
hinder the capacity of states to update and adapt cultura l policies to the digital era. The CETA 
is therefore a missed opportunity for both Ca nada and the EU to reconcile ru les of free trade 
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and cult ural policies. 
lt is worth noting too that CETA is not just a lost opportunity in t his respect. lt's also a 
worrying precedent for future bi lateral or multilateral agreements for those who look at the 
CETA text with t he anticipation of finding clues for the TTIP and the Trade in Services 
Agreement (TiSA; a trade agreement currently being negotiated by 23 members of the WTO). 
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